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Towards a sociology of nonhumans: technology and creativity 
 
Gavin Kendall 
Centre for Social Change Research 
QUT 
 
This paper examines innovative electronic music software and the ways in 
which (mainly Western) musicianly practices are produced and transformed.  
The paper seeks to move beyond the usual sorts of discussions of these issues, 
arranged as they are around the poles of technological determinism or 
individual musicianly genius, by using Actor-Network Theory as a lens for 
examining these transformations and productions.  Musicians and music 
technology are part of a complex web of interests, enrolments and translations, 
which can occasionally attain a precarious order. 
 
A series of software instruments developed by Propellerheads will be used as a 
case study: it will be shown that musicians do not impose their compositions 
upon a blank slate (the technology is not neutral in what it allows or forbids - it is 
the embodiment of a definite morality); nor is the technology simply used in 
ways which the developers envisaged.  The continuous production of new 
music technologies, new musicians and new types of music can be seen to be 
the result of this ongoing integration of human and non-human elements.  For 
example, the emergence and materialisation of nostalgia (software recreations 
of long-dead pieces of hardware) enable us to understand a human emotional 
response as given form and life through technology.  But at the same time, this 
nostalgia was never a pure human emotion: its shape was partly determined by 
earlier technology (old actions, allowed by the morality of the old technology, 
can resurface in new technology which harks back to the old). 
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Introduction: why a sociology of nonhumans? 
 
Sociology, as a typical human science, has not surprisingly sought to study human 
beings.  However, the focus on human beings has been maintained through a rather 
unhelpful process of purification, whereby an attempt is constantly made to isolate the 
human being from its nonhuman context (Latour 1993).  Yet we never see a pure 
human: humans are always mixed up with the technologies that surround them, clothe 
them, move them, preserve their utterances, and so forth.  As I sit here typing this, my 
clothes, spectacles, watch, wedding ring, desk, chair, computer hardware and software 
keep me warm, enable me to see, remind me of moral commitments, and channel and 
shape my thoughts.  We may imagine that morality resides in human beings, but is 
there any more fierce moral guardian than Microsoft’s suite of applications, which 
currently force me to limit the ideas I can have on any one slide, to spell like an 
American, and to worry about sentences without a main verb? 
 
As our pre-modern predecessors recognised, it is impossible to disentangle nature, 
culture, belief, ethics.  Yet as sociologists and modernists, we dance a strange dance 
where we avoid the nonhumans as best we can.  The sociology of culture, for instance, 
tries heroically to isolate ‘culture’ as a kind of infrastructure upon which ignorant 
humans frolic (see, for example, Alexander and Seidman 1990).  The sociology of 
science (at least until recently) was at great pains to rule scientific objects out of the 
field of study: the logic was that sociologists had nothing to say about gravity or atoms 
or whatever – what we should stick to are the pure humans who speed up or get in the 
way of discovery (Merton 1973).  Yet in both these disciplines, we ignore nonhumans 
at the cost of an impoverished analysis.  Cultural sociology needs its totems; the 
sociology of science needs an analysis of how scientific entities act. 
 
Recently, Bruno Latour has begun to draw our attention to the enormous amount of 
work done in our society by nonhuman actors. He suggests that one of the 
characteristics of our age is our (as he puts it, modernist) refusal to recognise all the 
nonhuman actors that are deeply embedded in our lives. Actors, like traffic lights, 
seatbelts, airbags and speed bumps, impose a morality ('stop here, now'; 'drive slowly'; 
'if you drive like an idiot and crash, don't kill yourself') which humans on their own are 
too weak or lazy to obey. Latour suggests that if we look around our world, it is 
impossible to see any situation which is made up of purely human actors: we are 
always enmeshed in a complex set of technologies.  For Latour, what is curious about 
our age is that we act as though these hybrids, these interconnected chains of humans 
and nonhumans, did not exist. We imagine we see pure humans everywhere, and 
where we see nonhumans, we downplay their importance: we do not take them 
seriously as actors. 
 
Creativity: surely not nonhuman? 
 
It is hard to take seriously the idea that nonhumans may be part of the story of human 
creativity.  We are so used to doing the modernist work of isolating the human that we 
ignore the work of other actors in this process.  Imagining Mozart or Beethoven, we 
always forget the little actors that constrain their brilliance and present them with 
creative possibilities – the instruments, the musical scales, the structure of musical 
pieces, and so forth.  Not anything is possible: and the brilliance of a Mozart or a 
Beethoven is accomplished within rules and limits managed by our little nonhuman 
friends.  For example, Beethoven's stunning Missa Solemnis is rightly regarded as a 
milestone in the history of classical music. It represents a bridge from church-inspired 
music to a more secular form, and paved the way for the opening up of new themes 
and figures in classical music composition. Yet in many ways its form and content are 
dictated by the demands of a religious performance.  
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The Missa Solemnis is revolutionary but unwieldy in that Beethoven creates something 
virtually unperformable in a church; yet still its lineage is unmistakable (pace Fischer 
1963: 190-2).  Beethoven, then, was free to innovate, but his innovation was 
constrained. There was only so much he could do, only certain instruments that he 
could work with, certain time signatures, certain scales, certain compositional 
structures. His creativity was limited by a series of other actors, most of whom were not 
human.  Beethoven was a hybrid, of course, as were all the great classical composers. 
 
Let me anticipate a possible objection at this point: we may all agree that the human 
and the nonhuman, the natural and the technological, are constantly in dialogue.  But 
surely there is a final point of reference: an ultimate humanity.  After all, it's the humans 
that act, and the technologies are just tools, just shorthands, just aides-memoires.  
What creativity is about is those ultimate humans – they deserve the credit, not the 
nonhumans who relentlessly police our world or who open up possibilities for us.   
 
I can deal with this objection by talking a detour through our evolutionary history.  As 
amateur palaeontologists, if we consider what it means to be human, it is hard to think 
that we can ever distil an essence of humanity that exists separately from technology, 
broadly conceptualised. Hirst and Woolley (1982: 5-22) discuss the development of 
what they take to be the three key (and interlinked) evolutionary developments in our 
species: the opposable thumb, bipedalism and brains of a certain size and structure. 
They argue that all of these developments are the result of the selection pressures of a 
tool-using way of life: "the limited bipedalism of Australopithecus made tool use 
possible and ... the use of tools consequently altered the terms of natural selection by 
establishing pressures in favour of tool use and tool making which eventually resulted 
in the physical structure of modem man" (1982: 13).  We cannot understand any of 
these fundamental developments in our evolutionary history by imagining a pure 
human (or prehuman) which then begins to interact with tools (culture).  The 
emergence of homo sapiens from earlier forms was a result of a prehuman-culture 
couple.  Without going into palaeontology in too much detail, what this suggests is that 
it is the interaction between the pre-human animal and the technology which leads to 
the birth of something we can call human. The human being is always-already 
technological, if you like a snappy motto. Homo sapiens are a direct result of a human-
nonhuman network. 
 
So creativity has always been a mixture of the human and the nonhuman, and we 
might also observe that creativity is always about the building and rebuilding of culture 
on top of itself.  Creativity is like a palimpsest, with our old culture always faintly 
discernible beneath the surface.  There is, then, a fundamental nostalgia built into 
creativity – nihil ex nihilo.  As cultural and creative animals, we are locked into hybridity, 
and we are locked into a relationship with our past. 
 
Electronic music: nonhumans helping out 
 
Let’s move on from our discussion of Beethoven and Australopithecus.  The 
development of systems for making electronic music has gathered pace in the last 40 
years (Pinch and Trocco 2002).  The hardware required to make electronic music has 
become cheaper, smaller, and more reliable.  The computer chips inside the hardware 
became cheaper and better (for example, finally overcoming the notorious tuning 
instabilities that dogged many early synthesisers).  It was inevitable that the computers 
inside these synthesisers would become more powerful, and the computer revolution 
has increased the speed of this development enormously in the last ten years.  
Electronic instruments that would have cost thousands of dollars and filled a small 
room can now be purchased in software form for a fraction of the cost.  It made sense 
that rather than buy a new computer again and again as one bought new hardware, 
one could purchase one powerful computer and run many instances of synthesisers as 
software.  Laptops can now contain recording studios, synthesisers, samplers and 
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sound manipulation and processing devices that could not have been dreamed of 20 
years ago.   
 
The field of electronic music is one to which the concept of the creative nonhuman 
comes easily.  For many years now, for example, electronic instruments have featured 
‘randomise’ features – a quick and easy way to generate music based on algorithms 
designed by the programmer.  One of the most famous and sought-after electronic 
musical instruments, the Roland TB-303, owes much of its power and popularity to its 
ability to generate random sequences.  The skilled user switches 
 
Figure 1: The Roland TB-303 
 
 
 
Image from www.synthmuseum.com
 
between sequences s/he has programmed, but also allows the TB-303 to generate its 
own variations.  The user, then, brings her/his hybrid humanity (remember, homo 
sapiens is always-already a hybrid of the human and the technological) into contact 
with this machine, which in its technology ‘stores’ a series of human-written algorithms. 
Incidentally (and this will delight those who enjoy stories of unintended consequences), 
the TB-303 was designed in 1982 to emulate a human bass player – a job it did 
appallingly.   Although an unmitigated failure as a substitute human bass player, it 
eventually found a home as a provider of the shrieks and blips so characteristic of acid 
house music, and it spawned a whole new genre of music. 
 
Two drum machines were also released by Roland at about the same time.  The TR-
808, like the 303, was designed to replace a human – in this case, a drummer. 
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Figure 2: The Roland TR-808 
 
 
 
Image from www.synthmuseum.com
 
Like the 303, it sounded nothing like a drummer, but its inhuman sounds were 
eventually used in new forms of dance music that celebrated the blurring of the human 
/ nonhuman divide – it really sounded like cyborg music.  The immediate 
 
Figure 3: The Roland TR-909 
 
 
 
Image from http://www.hopeinenomena.net
 
successor of the 808, the TR-909, sounded slightly more like a human playing real 
drums and percussion, but only marginally so, and again found more use in music that 
made a virtue of its ability to sound artificial and inhuman.  Like the 303, the 808 and 
 6
the 909 were characterised by the ability to create random sequences, and the skilled 
programmer would often mix computer- and human- generated sequences, as well as 
to use machine-generated variations.  In this way, the line between human and 
machine composition became blurred.  Drumbeats might feature a kick and a snare 
written by the human operator, but a hi-hat pattern that was randomly generated.  
Variations of this basic pattern might in turn be machine-generated.  The machines 
themselves, hybrids of the technological and the human (containing machine elements 
but modelled on human drum or bass performances) were played by humans who 
were always-already technological.  The human programmer sitting in front of the 
machine is an image like a Russian doll – the machine can be stripped back to reveal 
humans and machines inside it; and the human likewise can be stripped back to reveal 
previous humans and machines inside it. 
 
The generation of new forms of music out of these boxes clearly shows us the 
interdependence of the human and the nonhuman, and the extent to which the new 
(acid house music) can be generated from the old (attempts to replicate traditional bass 
guitars and drumkits). 
 
Nostalgic Software 
 
As the 303, 808 and 909 became increasingly popular, they became increasingly 
expensive.  By the early 1990s, second-hand models commanded prices of thousands 
of dollars (the best time to buy them was just after they were released, after people 
realised they were hopeless emulators of humans, but before people realised they 
were fantastic for generating new sorts of sounds).  By the late 1990s, the idea of 
replacing hardware with software versions – at a fraction of the cost – was at the 
forefront of many companies’ R&D efforts.  One of the first companies to realise this 
dream was the Swedish company Propellerhead, whose Rebirth software emulated the 
303 and the 808, and, in version 2 of the software, added an emulation of the 909.  
What I think is interesting about these early ventures to generate electronic music 
software is how backward-looking they were: the software usually sought first to 
recreate much-coveted hardware, rather than to invent something completely new.  My 
assertion here is that now not only was creativity made possible by a human – 
nonhuman package; so too nostalgia, an apparently human emotion, was given shape 
and form by software.  There are ironic touches, too, from the designers.  Note how in 
Figure 4, the software recreation of the Roland machines is presented as if they are 
mounted in wooden cheeks – a reminder of the old wooden synthesisers. 
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Figure 4: Propellerhead’s Rebirth (Version 2) 
 
 
 
Image from www.harmonycentral.com
 
 
There are now countless software emulations that hark back to the ‘classic’ machines 
of the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s – the Moogs, the Prophet 5, the Korg MS-20, Polysix 
and Wavestation, all these and more can now be purchased in software, and run on 
computers with minimal system requirements.  Space and money are much less of a 
problem than they were with these old hardware leviathans.  The software enable the 
user to recreate the sounds of a bygone era (with none of the tuning problems, and 
little risk of slipped disc – I can bear witness to how heavy the old synths were to lug 
around town). 
 
The New from the Old 
 
More recently, the fad of recreating tried and trusted synthesisers in software seems to 
be coming to an end.  R&D seems now to concentrate on the invention of new forms of 
software.  Propellerhead, for example, has developed a far more powerful suite of 
synthesiser, sampler and sound processing units, in a modular rack system called 
Reason.  This software develops some new techniques of synthesis, including granular 
synthesis.  Again, ironic and nostalgic touches abound: the software is  
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Figure 5: Propellerhead’s Reason 
 
 
 
 
Image from www.synthman.com
 
presented in a rackmount with virtual screws (an ‘Easter Egg’ allows one to unscrew 
them and they fall out of the rack); the sampler is called the NN-19, reminding one of 
the stuttering ‘n-n-n 19’ sample effect of Paul Hardcastle’s chart-topping record.  While 
Reason goes far beyond the capabilities of Rebirth, the links with the past are not 
completely cut off, and in many subtle ways the software appeals to the glories of the 
past while promising future innovations.  The hybridity here is of the old and the new – 
the software’s design harks back to the best of the old, while suggesting new 
possibilities.  The drum machine, for example – called ReDrum – visually recalls the 
808 and 909, but adds levels of signal processing and routing that far exceed the 
possibilities of those old machines.  As the new is gently written on top of the old, the 
user is taken from nostalgia for the great old machines of the past to a kind of guided 
invention of the future.  This indicates, perhaps, a kind of conservatism in the end user 
that the designer has to engage with.  Slowly, innovation is generated from an 
established and prestigious base, from accepted classics to new possibilities.  In a 
curious way this echoes the story of the Missa Solemnis – radically new music is 
forged on top of an established practice. 
 
(W)rapping Up 
 
Electronic music is often despised as artificial, cold, inhuman.  Of course, much 
electronic music strives for this effect, or at least to explore the ways in which this effect 
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can say something about modern life and its technological character.  The music of 
Kraftwerk or Gary Numan, for example, deliberately plays on these tropes.  But 
electronic music is always a hybrid of the human and the nonhuman.  Paradoxically, 
the most purely ‘human’ music one could imagine – maybe a lone singer, standing 
upright, using language, using a brain of a certain size – is also a result of a human-
nonhuman synthesis.  It is harder and harder to see how we can analyse these hybrids 
and keep some pure human separate from the nonhuman that we are, perhaps, scared 
will pollute it.  But it is a mistake to insist on these forms of purity, and a mistake to 
dismiss the creative power that these powerful hybrids possess.  In echoing the 
technological aspects of the human, perhaps this machine music expresses something 
fundamental in our species. 
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